{"id":6015,"date":"2020-08-24T09:49:15","date_gmt":"2020-08-24T14:49:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cdes.org.ec\/webantigua\/?p=6015"},"modified":"2021-06-07T16:24:57","modified_gmt":"2021-06-07T16:24:57","slug":"mas-de-lo-mismo-en-pandemia-beneficios-para-prestamistas-deuda-para-los-pueblos","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cdes.org.ec\/webantigua\/mas-de-lo-mismo-en-pandemia-beneficios-para-prestamistas-deuda-para-los-pueblos\/","title":{"rendered":"M\u00e1s de lo mismo en Pandemia: Beneficios para Prestamistas, Deuda para los Pueblos"},"content":{"rendered":"\r\n

English version below<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\r\n

Vers\u00e3o em portugu\u00eas abaixo<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\r\n

M\u00e1s de lo mismo en Pandemia: Beneficios para Prestamistas, Deuda para los Pueblos<\/strong><\/h2>\r\n

En comunicado oficial del 3 de agosto de 2020, el gobierno ecuatoriano anunci\u00f3 haber alcanzado un acuerdo para la\u00a0reestructuraci\u00f3n de su deuda externa con acreedores privados<\/em><\/strong><\/a>. La renegociaci\u00f3n se realiz\u00f3 sobre el 41 por ciento del total de la deuda externa ecuatoriana, de la cual dos terceras partes (65 por ciento) fue adquirida bajo el mandato del presidente Len\u00edn Moreno. Sobre este acuerdo expresamos que:<\/p>\r\n

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  1. MAYOR PARTE DE DEUDA RENEGOCIADA CUBRI\u00d3 D\u00c9FICIT COMERCIAL Y SERVICIO DE DEUDA.<\/strong>\u00a0La deuda contra\u00edda por el gobierno de Len\u00edn Moreno (US$ 19 mil 813 millones \u2013 a marzo de 2020), que corresponde al 65% de la deuda reestructurada con acreedores privados, se us\u00f3 para pagar intereses y capital de deuda (US$ 14 mil 541 millones), y el resto para cubrir los d\u00e9ficits de la balanza de pagos por el incremento abrupto de las importaciones (US$ 5 mil 977 millones); en lugar de servir para el campo productivo o social de la econom\u00eda. Este tipo de endeudamiento es considerado como deuda ileg\u00edtima por el movimiento social contra la deuda, debido a que no ha beneficiado a la poblaci\u00f3n.<\/li>\r\n
  2. ESTA REESTRUCTURACI\u00d3N ATENTA CONTRA LOS DERECHOS ECON\u00d3MICOS Y SOCIALES.<\/strong>\u00a0A pesar de que implica un alivio fiscal para los pr\u00f3ximos a\u00f1os y evita el riesgo de default, la reestructuraci\u00f3n realizada por el actual gobierno ecuatoriano no representa ninguna salida sostenible a la crisis de deuda que atraviesa; reduce el margen presupuestal de pol\u00edticas p\u00fablicas en plena pandemia, atentando contra los derechos econ\u00f3micos y sociales de la poblaci\u00f3n (bonos, subsidios, reactivaci\u00f3n econ\u00f3mica familiar, etc.), fundamental para enfrentar el impacto del nuevo coronavirus.<\/li>\r\n
  3. IMPONE AJUSTE FISCAL, REFORMA TRIBUTARIA REGRESIVA Y FLEXIBILIZACI\u00d3N DEL TRABAJO.\u00a0<\/strong>Entre las condiciones de esta renegociaci\u00f3n se incluye un nuevo acuerdo con el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI), con las condicionalidades que estos programas implican. En medio de la pandemia, el gobierno ecuatoriano se ha autoimpuesto las pol\u00edticas de ajuste del FMI que incluir\u00edan los deberes no cumplidos del acuerdo previo con el FMI en 2019: una reforma para la flexibilizaci\u00f3n del trabajo, una reforma para la \u201cautonom\u00eda\u201d del Banco Central y una reforma tributaria regresiva. Adem\u00e1s, no existir\u00eda garant\u00eda que este nuevo acuerdo cumpla con los requisitos de consulta legislativa y ratificaci\u00f3n constitucional previa tal como manda la ley ecuatoriana.<\/li>\r\n
  4. BENEFICIA EXCESIVAMENTE A LOS ACREEDORES Y TRANSFIERE ESTE COSTO AL PUEBLO.<\/strong>\u00a0El acuerdo beneficia a los tenedores de deuda al revalorizar los precios de los bonos. La reestructuraci\u00f3n hecha por el gobierno de Len\u00edn Moreno ha obviado que, debido a la pandemia, el valor nominal de los bonos ecuatorianos cay\u00f3 al 35 por ciento de su valor. No obstante, la negociaci\u00f3n de estos bonos reconoci\u00f3 el\u00a059 por ciento<\/a>\u00a0(a valor presente) y un 91 por ciento (a valor nominal). As\u00ed, el gobierno ecuatoriano no solo garantiz\u00f3 la renta a los tenedores, sino que transfiri\u00f3 el riesgo especulativo que enfrenta el gran capital, recayendo este sobre la poblaci\u00f3n. Con esta renegociaci\u00f3n, el gobierno transfiri\u00f3 gran parte del costo de la crisis del nuevo coronavirus hacia la poblaci\u00f3n ecuatoriana, a costa de los contribuyentes, primando el beneficio de los tenedores privados externos. Esto viola el Art. 290.3 de la Constituci\u00f3n ecuatoriana: \u201c\u2026S\u00f3lo se podr\u00e1 refinanciar deuda p\u00fablica externa, siempre que las nuevas condiciones sean m\u00e1s beneficiosas para el Ecuador\u201d.<\/li>\r\n
  5. CAPITALIZA INTERESES, ALGO PROHIBIDO POR LA CONSTITUCI\u00d3N ECUATORIANA.<\/strong>\u00a0El acuerdo contiene la capitalizaci\u00f3n de intereses bajo la forma de un bono denominado \u201cBono PDI 2030\u201d<\/em>, con el potencial pago de \u201cintereses sobre intereses\u201d en caso de mora.\u00a0<\/em>En Ecuador, la capitalizaci\u00f3n de intereses (anatocismo) est\u00e1 prohibida por el marco constitucional (Art. 290.4) referente a las regulaciones del endeudamiento p\u00fablico. Es importante tener presente que, en 2008, el gobierno ecuatoriano de aqu\u00e9l entonces calific\u00f3 de \u201cileg\u00edtima e ilegal\u201d un tramo de su deuda, luego de determinar mediante un proceso de auditoria, una emisi\u00f3n de bonos que tuvo una renegociaci\u00f3n con similares caracter\u00edsticas a la reestructuraci\u00f3n actual. Por tanto, la renegociaci\u00f3n de la deuda hecha por Len\u00edn Moreno ser\u00eda tambi\u00e9n ileg\u00edtima.<\/li>\r\n
  6. NO CONSIDERA LA CORRESPONSABILIDAD DE LOS PRESTAMISTAS.<\/strong>\u00a0El endeudamiento de nuestros pa\u00edses es generado por desigualdades y asimetr\u00edas en la arquitectura financiera vigente, a favor del capital y de quienes concentran la riqueza. La entrada de recursos en forma de cr\u00e9ditos no puede dejar de incorporar el criterio de corresponsabilidad entre prestatarios y prestamistas, tanto en las condiciones financieras, como para evitar que el uso de estos recursos haya sido contratado en contra de los intereses del pa\u00eds. Sin embargo, este criterio ha sido dejado de lado en la renegociaci\u00f3n.<\/li>\r\n
  7. REFLEJA LA URGENCIA DE TRANSFORMAR LA ARQUITECTURA FINANCIERA INTERNACIONAL.<\/strong>\u00a0El proceso de renegociaci\u00f3n de la deuda del gobierno ecuatoriano refleja las fallas de un sistema que prioriza el pago de deuda y los intereses a los acreedores, antes que la vida humana. La renegociaci\u00f3n hecha por el gobierno ecuatoriano significa solo la postergaci\u00f3n del pago de intereses a cambio de un incremento del servicio de la deuda en el largo plazo. Esto demuestra la necesidad de establecer un proceso de reestructuraci\u00f3n de la deuda justo, independiente, oportuno y transparente, planteado desde el siglo pasado por diversas organizaciones parte del movimiento internacional contra la deuda. Un proceso que vele y priorice los intereses de la poblaci\u00f3n y permita el logro de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS), y en particular, que ning\u00fan gobierno ecuatoriano atente contra el Art. 290.2 de su Constituci\u00f3n Pol\u00edtica que establece \u201cque el endeudamiento p\u00fablico no afecte a la soberan\u00eda, los derechos, el buen vivir y la preservaci\u00f3n de la naturaleza\u201d.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n

    Por todo esto,\u00a0Latindadd considera ileg\u00edtima la reestructuraci\u00f3n realizada por el gobierno de Len\u00edn Moreno.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\r\n

    Ante la necesidad urgente de recursos para afrontar esta crisis sin precedentes y proteger a la poblaci\u00f3n en el contexto pand\u00e9mico,\u00a0demandamos la anulaci\u00f3n del servicio de la deuda externa ecuatoriana,\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>tanto del principal como los intereses y cargos, que tengan vencimiento en 2020 y 2021, con una anulaci\u00f3n permanente que no acumule una carga futura, y de forma inmediata para liberar recursos que permitan hacer frente a las urgentes crisis sanitarias, sociales y econ\u00f3micas resultantes del nuevo coronavirus.<\/p>\r\n

    Finalmente, y ante una crisis con impactos de largo plazo, urge una renegociaci\u00f3n leg\u00edtima, con el\u00a0establecimiento de un proceso justo de reestructuraci\u00f3n de la deuda soberana<\/strong>\u00a0hacia futuras reestructuraciones de la deuda ecuatoriana con acreedores bilaterales y multilaterales.<\/p>\r\n

    Am\u00e9rica Latina, agosto de 2020<\/p>\r\n

    \u00a0<\/p>\r\n

    \u00a0<\/p>\r\n

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    LATINDADD AGAINST ECUADOR\u00b4S DEBT RESTRUCTURING<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\r\n

    More of the Same in the Pandemic: Benefits for Lenders, Debt for the People<\/strong><\/h3>\r\n

    In an official statement dated August 3, 2020, the Ecuadorian government announced that it had reached an agreement for the\u00a0restructuring of its external debt with private creditors<\/a>. The renegotiation was carried out on 41 percent of Ecuador\u00b4s total foreign debt, of which two thirds (65 percent) was acquired under the mandate of President Lenin Moreno. About this agreement, we express that:<\/p>\r\n

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    1. A SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF RENEGOTIATED DEBT COVERS TRADE DEFICIT AND DEBT SERVICE.\u00a0<\/strong>Debt contracted by the Lenin Moreno administration (US $ 19,813 million \u2013 as of March 2020), which corresponds to 65% of the restructured debt with private creditors, was used to repay debt interests and principal (US $ 14,541 million), and the rest to cover balance of payments deficits due to the abrupt increase in imports (US $ 5,977 million); instead of supporting the productive or social sectors of the economy. This type of indebtedness is considered illegitimate by the social movement against debt, because it has not benefited the population.<\/li>\r\n
    2. THIS RESTRUCTURING TRANSGRESSES ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS.\u00a0<\/strong>Although it implies fiscal relief for the next few years and reduces the risk of default, the restructuring carried out by the current Ecuadorian government does not represent a sustainable solution to the ongoing debt crisis it faces. It reduces the fiscal space for public policies in the midst of the pandemic, undermining the economic and social rights of the population (bonuses, subsidies, family economy reactivation, etc.), which are fundamental to face the impact of the new coronavirus.<\/li>\r\n
    3. IT IMPOSES FISCAL ADJUSTMENT, A REGRESSIVE TAX REFORM, AND LABOR FLEXIBILITY.\u00a0<\/strong>The conditions for this renegotiation include a new agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with the conditionality that these programs imply. In the midst of the pandemic, the Ecuadorian government has imposed the IMF\u2019s adjustment policies that would include the unfulfilled duties of the previous agreement with the IMF in 2019: a reform aiming for more flexibility in the labor market, a reform consolidating the autonomy of the Central Bank, and a regressive tax reform. In addition, there would be no guarantee that this new agreement meets the requirements of legislative consultation and prior constitutional ratification, as mandated by Ecuadorian law.<\/li>\r\n
    4. IT BENEFITS THE CREDITORS EXCESSIVELY AND TRANSFERS THIS COST TO THE PEOPLE.<\/strong>\u00a0The deal benefits debt holders by increasing bond prices. The restructuring carried out by the Lenin Moreno government has overlooked that, due to the pandemic, the nominal value of Ecuadorian bonds fell to 35 percent of their value. However, the negotiation of these bonds recognized\u00a059 percent<\/a>\u00a0(at present value) and 91 percent (at face value). Thus, the Ecuadorian government not only guaranteed the income to the holders, but also transferred the speculative risk faced by large investment capitals to the people. With this renegotiation, the government transferred a large part of the cost of the new coronavirus crisis to the Ecuadorian population, at the expense of taxpayers, giving priority to the interests of foreign private holders. This violates Art. 290.3 of the Ecuadorian Constitution: \u201c\u2026 external public debt may be refinanced, provided that the new conditions are more beneficial for Ecuador.\u201d<\/li>\r\n
    5. IT CAPITALIZES INTERESTS, SOMETHING FORBIDDEN BY THE ECUADORIAN CONSTITUTION.<\/strong>\u00a0The agreement envisages the capitalization of interests in the form of a bond called \u201cPDI 2030 Bond\u201d, with the potential payment of \u201cinterests on interests\u201d in case of default. In Ecuador, the capitalization of interest (anatocism or usury) is prohibited by the constitutional legal framework (Art. 290.4) referring to the regulations of public indebtedness. It is important to note that, in 2008, the Ecuadorian government of that time classified as \u201cillegitimate and illegal\u201d a portion of its debt after identifying, through an audit process, a bond issuing subject to a renegotiation with similar characteristics to the current restructuring. Therefore, the debt renegotiation made by Lenin Moreno\u00b4s administration would also be illegitimate.<\/li>\r\n
    6. IT DOES NOT CONSIDER THE CORRESPONSIBILITY OF THE LENDERS.\u00a0<\/strong>The indebtedness of our countries is generated by inequalities and asymmetries in the current financial architecture, in favor of investment capitals and of those who concentrate wealth. The inflow of resources in the form of credits should not fail to incorporate the notion of joint responsibility between borrowers and lenders, in terms of the agreed financial conditions, and also to avoid that the use of these resources has been contracted against the interests of the country. However, these aspects have been set aside in the renegotiation.<\/li>\r\n
    7. IT REFLECTS THE URGENCY OF TRANSFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE.\u00a0<\/strong>The process of debt renegotiation by the Ecuadorian government reflects the failures of a system that prioritizes the payment of debt and interests to creditors ahead of human life. The renegotiation made by the Ecuadorian government merely implies the postponement of interest payments in exchange for an increase in debt service in the long term. This demonstrates the need to establish a fair, independent, timely and transparent debt restructuring process, proposed since the last century by various organizations that are part of the international movement against debt. Such process must prioritize the interests of the population and allow the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and in particular, must ensure that no Ecuadorian government violates Art. 290.2 of the country\u00b4s Constitution, which establishes \u201cthat public debt must not affect sovereignty rights, good living and the preservation of nature.\u201d<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n

      In light of the above, Latindadd considers the debt restructuring carried out by the Lenin Moreno government illegitimate.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\r\n

      Given the urgent need for fresh resources to face this unprecedented crisis and protect the population in the pandemic context, we demand the cancellation of the Ecuadorian external debt service, including the principal, interests and charges, which are due in 2020 and 2021. It should be permanent so that it does not accumulate a future burden, and immediate in order to free up resources to deal with the urgent health, social and economic needs resulting from the new coronavirus.<\/p>\r\n

      Finally, and in the face of a crisis with long-term impacts, a legitimate renegotiation is urgently needed, with the implementation of a fair process of sovereign debt restructuring towards future restructuring processes of the Ecuadorian debt with bilateral and multilateral creditors.<\/p>\r\n

      Latin America, August of 2020<\/p>\r\n

      Publicamos este pronunciamiento sobre la reestructurci\u00f3n de la deuda ecuatoriana, elaborada por la Red Latinoamericana de Justicia Econ\u00f3mica y Justicia Social – Latindadd, en donde CDES es parte desde Ecuador.<\/h6>\r\n \t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":6016,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_siteseo_robots_primary_cat":"","_joinchat":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[46,51],"tags":[61,62],"class_list":["post-6015","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-deuda","category-politicamonetaria","tag-tenedores-privados","tag-veeduria-ciudadana"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cdes.org.ec\/webantigua\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6015","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cdes.org.ec\/webantigua\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cdes.org.ec\/webantigua\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cdes.org.ec\/webantigua\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cdes.org.ec\/webantigua\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6015"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/cdes.org.ec\/webantigua\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6015\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7919,"href":"https:\/\/cdes.org.ec\/webantigua\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6015\/revisions\/7919"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cdes.org.ec\/webantigua\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6016"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cdes.org.ec\/webantigua\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6015"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cdes.org.ec\/webantigua\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6015"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cdes.org.ec\/webantigua\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6015"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}